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Dynamical grammar is the second part of a two-volume work entitled
‘Foundations of Syntax’. Volume 1, Syntactic nuts: hard cases, syntactic
theory, and language acquisition (Culicover 1999), investigated the properties
of language itself, with the aim of establishing the boundary conditions on
the learning mechanisms responsible for language acquisition. It focused
especially on aspects of (syntactic) learning that do not exemplify the regular
and exceptionless properties of human language, but rather the irregular, the
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452marked and the downright idiosyncratic. Volume 2, Dynamical grammar,
turns to the internal properties of the learner and investigates whether it is
possible to model the process of language acquisition in terms of a complex
adaptive system. While Syntactic nuts was aimed predominantly at syntac-
ticians with a primary interest in language acquisition, Dynamical grammar
should be of interest to a wider audience, as it addresses fundamental ques-
tions about the nature of grammar and its relation to the mind, including
issues relating to the computational properties of human language.
The book consists ofthree parts.PartI,‘Foundations’,which includes two
chapters, outlines the dynamical perspective on language and discusses prob-
lems with the Principles and Parameters view of language acquisition. Part II,
‘Simulations’ (chapters 3–6), contains computational simulations of lexical
learning,syntacticlearning,andlanguagechange.PartIII,‘Grammar’,which
comprises the ﬁnal chapter of the book, explores the adequacy of the kind of
syntactic analyses to which the dynamical system approach gives rise.
Chapter 1, ‘The dynamical perspective’, presents the authors’ view of
grammar as a dynamical system and discusses how this diﬀers from the
I-language view held by Chomsky and his followers. The key claim advanced
here is that there is no such thing as a mental grammar. Rather, the fact
that human languages have properties that appear to lend themselves to
description in terms of a grammar is a consequence of a combination of
factors. First, language expresses thought, whose representations are them-
selves highly compositional. As a result, so it is argued, it is only natural that
the structure of thought should reveal itself in the medium through which it
is expressed. Second, the mechanisms for language learning are capable of
generalization, and generalizations give rise to what appear to be rules.
Finally, the favoured methodology in linguistics is to disregard exceptions
and counterexamples. According to the authors, a linguistic theory does
not characterize the mental object of study but rather the regularities in its
external behaviour.
According to the dynamical perspective, what is present in the learner
prior to acquisition is the representational system in which meaning is
expressed, that is, Conceptual Structure (see Jackendoﬀ 1990), itself a highly
structuredandprincipledsystem, andsomeminimalmechanismsforlearning
how to relate a string of words to a representation in Conceptual Structure.
This dynamical system takes shape over time and eventually comes to behave
as if it embodied a set of rules, but in fact the grammar is merely an emergent
property of the dynamical system.
This view of grammar as an emergent property is contrasted with the
Chomskyan perspective, which adopts a ‘static’ view of language, according
to which we are born with a mental grammar upon which we draw to speak
and understand our language. On this view, language acquisition amounts
to setting parameters in this mental grammar on the basis of linguistic
experience.
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a dynamical system. Words and sentences are represented in a mental space.
A sequence of words corresponds to a trajectory through this space. An
often-traveled trajectory will have a lower energy requirement than a less
commonly traveled trajectory. By requiring the system to minimize its energy
requirements, it is forced into self-reorganization, grouping similar trajec-
tories into ‘ﬂows’. The sequence of internal states that the system passes
through as a result of these reorganizations should reﬂect the way humans
learn and generalize.
Chapter 2, ‘Language acquisition and linguistic theory’, is a critical
evaluation of the Principles and Parameters model of language acquisition.
The authors outline various problems and paradoxes associated with the
idea that the learner must parse input in order to set parameters. This outline
converges on the conclusion that the Principles and Parameters model
‘seeds’ the learning environment to an unwarranted extent: if the general-
izations embodied in parameters can be extracted from the environment
without prior knowledge, then Occam’s razor requires that the relevant
generalization must not be attributed to an innate property of the learner.
The following three chapters set out to test, througha series of simulations,
how much and what kind of prior knowledge must be attributed to the
learner in order to account for language acquisition. Chapter 3, ‘The
computational simulation of language acquisition: Aqui’, investigates the
limitations of a purely distributional approach to the acquisition of syntactic
categories and concludes that such an approach is inadequate. The best a
distributional technique can achieve is to discover semantically determined
distributional regularities (unless the input to the system is seeded with the
syntactic information it is meant to discover in the ﬁrst place). Chapters 4,
‘Computational simulation of language acquisition: CAMiLLe’, and 5,
‘Experiments with CAMiLLe’, explore a dynamical system, CAMiLLe
(Conservative Attentive Minimalist Language Learner), that has access to
the meaningof the expressions to which itis exposed. A meaningcorresponds
to a representation in Conceptual Structure. Since these representations are
themselves hierarchically structured and compositional, the learning mech-
anism has ‘considerable information about the likely syntactic structure of
the linguistic expression’ (102). The authors argue that this information may
be suﬃcient for successful language acquisition.
CAMiLLe has two representational systems, one for syntax and one for
semantics. The system’s learning task is to formulate correspondence rules
thatmapastringofwordsontoarepresentationinConceptualStructure.This
process can be understood as the formation of couplings between trajectories
in a syntactic space andtrajectories in a semantic space.Self-organization has
the eﬀect that couplings that are similar (for example, those that diﬀer in only
one element in each representation) will migrate towards each other. In other
words, the same organizational process that is active within the syntactic
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the mapping system between the syntactic and the semantic space.
Parsing is viewed as the process of reducing a string to a head. For
example, when the string tall man is coupled with the meaning MAN(TALL),
this causes tall man to be reduced to man. Furthermore, the parser has no
way of representing anything resembling a movement chain.
The experiments with CAMiLLe focus on categorization, structure and
word order. Successful categorization seems to be hampered by the small size
of the artiﬁcial data sets. The problems are mostly related to the lack of
‘complete exempliﬁcation’:for successfulcategorization totake placeaword
must be presented in suﬃciently many and suﬃciently varied examples with
associated meaning. But since the meanings for adata setmust all be supplied
by hand, the samples on which CAMiLLe learns are of necessity quite small.
The experiments with structure are concerned with the acquisition of the
internalstructureofDeterminerPhrases,argumentstructureandparsing.The
systemdoesnotperformwellontheﬁrsttask,forreasonsthatremainunclear.
By contrast, the extraction of argument structure correspondences is more
successful. The discussion of parsing explains the system’s limited ability to
reduceadjacentwordstoahead.Theprocessofﬁndingacorrectreduction‘is
complex and involves many wrong guesses’ (165). The basic system is also
unable to deal with words that it recognizes but cannot assign a meaning to.
The authors conclude that CAMiLLe’s strategy of reducing a string to a head
is in principle able to assign correct structure at the phrasal level.
The experiments with word order, ﬁnally, produce mixed results. Thus, the
system is unable to arrive at correct generalizations in the domain of
scrambling, apparently because too much information at the start of learning
oﬀers too many opportunities for spurious generalizations from which the
learning system cannot recover. In a similar vein, the presence of too much
diversity in form and interpretation associated with inversion phenomena
appears to present an insurmountable challenge for CAMiLLe (see Elman
1993 for related discussion).
In chapter 6, ‘Language change’, the authors argue that social networks
can be modeled as dynamical systems and that language ‘gaps’ (logically
possible but non-existent languages) may result spontaneously from the
transmission of linguistic properties in such networks (see also Culicover,
Nowak& Borkowski 2003). It is suggested that the existence of Greenbergian
implicational universals can be understood along these lines. An extension of
the model concerns a hypothesis about the main force driving reorganisation
of the dynamical system, put forward by Culicover & Nowak (2003). They
argue that computational complexity associated with a particular cluster of
grammatical propertiesresultsin abias againstthat cluster, which willin turn
lead to gaps in the set of (logically) possible languages.
Finally,chapter7,‘Concreteminimalism’,turnstothequestionofwhether
the dynamical model lends itself to adequate accounts of well-known
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ofaminimalgrammar,suchaslexicalcategories,phrasalcategories,structure
and movement, can be represented in a dynamical system. This is followed
by ‘concrete minimalist’ treatments of head-complement order, verb raising
to the inﬂectional head I, verb second and inversion, clitic ordering, null
arguments, wh-movement and scrambling. The analyses put forward are in
terms of a very much simpler syntax than those in current minimalist work,
allowing for syntactic representations that map onto representations in
Conceptual Structure in a more transparent fashion than their counterparts
in current minimalist theories.
Dynamical grammar makes an important contribution to the ongoing
debate about how much innate structure must be attributed to the language
learner. It explores a form of Linguistic Cognitivism that attempts to restrict
innate structure to the domain of semantics (Conceptual Structure). As far as
syntax isconcerned,all thatthelearnerstartsoutwithisaminimallyspeciﬁed
dynamical system. The exploration is backed up by actual simulations, using
a simple version of the kind of dynamical system that the authors envisage.
This allows the authors to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their
proposals, and gives the reader a much better perspective on the issues at
stake than an abstract presentation of the ideas on its own ever could. On the
whole, this is a thought-provoking and worthwhile exercise that bears fruit in
a number of ways.
Alongside proposals about the nature of language acquisition, Dynamical
grammar also presents arguments for what one could call a ‘simpler’ syntax.
Although these two aspects of the book are intertwined – the simpler syntax
is much more suited to the dynamical view of language acquisition on
oﬀer – readers who ﬁnd themselves unable to accept several of the arguments
against the Principles and Parameters theory may still ﬁnd much of value in
the arguments for a simpler syntax.
I would like to single out two points for further discussion. Part I of the
book moves smoothly from an argument against mental grammar (and in
favour of emergence) to an argument against innately speciﬁed properties of
syntax. My own view is that it is unhelpful to conﬂate these issues, which
are logically independent. One could reject the view that a speaker-hearer’s
I-language is explicitly mentally represented and still accept that Universal
Grammar is a correct theory of the emergent properties of our language
faculty that our genes have been selected for. Put diﬀerently, our genetic
endowment does not have to take the form of a mental grammar, present at
birth. Instead, it may impose constraints on the way a dynamical system
‘unfolds’ over time.
The authors devote a lot of eﬀort to establishing that the dynamical system
can learn various aspects of natural language, but very little is said about
what it canNOT learn. This is an important omission because a general
learning mechanism may be able to learn regularities that are not in fact
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strings to representations in Conceptual Structure, coupled with pressure to
keep this mapping simple, is suﬃcient to rule out such unwanted conse-
quences (after all, the properties of Conceptual Structure are themselves in-
nately speciﬁed). But it is far from clear that this logic will be suﬃcient in the
general case. Consider an example. Ak-movement gives rise to a freezing
eﬀect: the Ak-moved constituent is an island for extraction. It seems im-
plausible to attribute this to semantic properties of the resulting structure. If
it is attributed to issues of computational complexity or ‘extreme twisting in
the correspondence between the string and the C[onceptual] S[tructure]’
(236), then why are freezing eﬀects absent in the case of A-movement?
Overall, I found this a very enjoyable and worthwhile book. Its provoca-
tive stance forces the reader to reconsider the adequacy of a number of
fundamental assumptions in linguistics, which cannot be a bad thing. Several
of the results reported in this book, and particularly those about language
change, deserve every linguist’s careful consideration.
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